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Rethinking Children as Property: the Complex Family  
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the collective view in law and social practice that it is 
intrinsically taboo to consider human beings as chattel, the law persists in 
treating children as property. Applying principles of property, this Article 
examines paternity disputes to explain and critique the law’s view of 
children as property of their parents.   As evidenced in these conflicts, I 
demonstrate that legal paternity exposes a rhetoric of ownership, 
possession, and exchange.  The law presumes that a child born to a married 
woman is fathered by her husband, even when irrefutable proof exists that 
another man fathered the child.  Attempts by the non-marital biological 
father to assert parental rights regularly fail, as states allow only one father 
to “claim” the child.  This approach treats the nonmarital father as a 
trespasser and categorically favors the fundamental due process rights of the 
marital father. 
 
Analyzing these family law cases along a property framework offers a 
rethinking of the law’s imbalanced treatment of unmarried fathers.  The 
law’s current approach to paternity disputes reflects a classic model of 
property rights and ownership rooted in static, rigid, and exclusive claims.  
This framework ignores the interests of children in their biological fathers 
while overestimating the reproductive normativity of marriage.  
 
This Article joins in recent discussions of “stewardship” models 
of property that engage the complexities of nontitled claims to 
property.  It draws upon constitutional law, property theory, and 
political philosophy to assert the possibility that the interests of 
children are better served by protecting and nurturing those 
relationships (i.e., those with the biological father) that are 
normally defeated by traditional appeals to substantive due 
process.  By highlighting the claims of nonmarital, biological 
fathers divested of standing to assert paternal rights, I suggest a 
turn to a fiduciary ethic that entertains the unique legal status of 
what I call the “complex family.”  This engagement of a 
textured—as opposed to flat and conclusory—model of the hybrid 
marital/nonmarital family recognizes the unwed father’s property 
rights in the child as nontitled, while the marital unit acts as a 
fiduciary caregiver with legal rights to the child.  By embracing 
the counterintuitive notion of children as property, I argue for a 
redirection of the existing framework of property theory to a 
productive model for the family that champions the best interests 
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of the child in tandem with the constitutional interests of marital 
and nonmarital parents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Conceptualizing children as property invites trouble, but 
for unexpected reasons.  Although some consider it “patently 
unthinkable”1 to characterize parent/child relationships within a 
classic rhetoric of ownership and possession,2 these expected 
reactions make up a small part of a much larger conversation.3  
Judges, lawyers, and litigants employ the language of property 
when adjudicating legal parenthood;4 parental “interests” are 
“deserving of protection”5; mothers of nonmarital children are 
“entitled to possession”6; children “belong” to either parents or the 
                                               
* Associate Professor.  This Article benefited from workshops and 
presentations at University of Richmond School of Law, the Emerging Family 
Law Scholars Group, Brown University, and Hofstra Law School.  I am also 
very thankful of the supportive intellectual community around me of Rose 
Cuison Villazor, Sonia Kaytal, Melissa Murray, Zanita Fenton, Robin Paul 
Malloy, Nina Kohn, Peter Bell, Richard Ellison, Janis McDonald, Paula 
Johnson, Kristen Carpenter, Angela Riley, Herbie DiFonzo, Janet Dolgin, 
Hillary Burgess, Akilah Folami, James Sample, Marc Poirier, Serena Mayeri, 
David Rubenstein, Ammon Allred, Linda Ayers, Solangel Maldonado, Ed Stein, 
Dan Greenwood, Liz Glazer, Doug Rennie, Meredith Johnson Harbach, 
Katherine Franke, Laura Rosenbury, Adrienne Davis, Jeff Redding, Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, Bennett Capers, Tucker Culbertson, Camille Nelson, Mr. 
George, and Iris Chiu.  Many thanks also to Brenda Guiliano for last minute 
research assistance.  
1 Kristen Carpenter, Angela Riley, and Sonia Katyal, In Defense Of Property, 
118 Yale L.J., 1031 (2009) [hereinafter ‘CARPENTER ET AL’] ("It seems patently 
unthinkable that property law should govern such an intimate domain.") 
2 At common law, children did not enjoy the same legal protection as 
adults, but instead had the same legal privileges as livestock and pets. Judith 
Areen points out that children in Victorian New York were protected by the 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (now known as the SPCA). See 
Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the 
State’s Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 894 (1975). 
3 See, e.g., Ayelet Blecher-Prigat , Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental to 
a Relational Right, 16 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 1 (2009); Justin Witkin, A 
Time for Change: Reevaluating the Constitutional Status of Minors, 47 FLA. L. 
REV. 113, 116 (1995);  Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional 
Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187, 1217 (1993); James G. O'Keefe, The Need to 
Consider Children's Rights in Biological Parents v. Third Party Custody 
Disputes, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1077 (1991). 
4 See, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child: Meyer and Pierce 
and the Child as Property, 33 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 995 (1992) [hereinafter 
‘WOODHOUSE’]  (discussing the legal language of property in regards to children). 
5 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 399 (1979) (diss.) 
6 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 249 n.5 (1978). 
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state;7 and fathers may be “deprived of access to their children.8  
These exclusive and possessive claims to children reveal a solid 
linguistics of entitlement that resemble property law doctrines of 
dominion, exclusion, and tenancy.   
 But the unexpected trouble of the family/property discourse 
stems from property’s fundamental rigidity that narrows the 
possibility of who qualifies as family. The traditional concept of 
property is binary and definitive—it conclusively determines 
ownership and it efficiently delineates holder from non-holder.9  
This classic approach to property couples dominion with title.  
With an identification of the owner and a clear chain of title, a 
court may discover the legal holder of the property.  Those 
without title find difficulty in asserting a legitimate interest in 
property.  
 This Essay proposes a rethinking of existing property 
theories in the context of marital children born to unmarried 
fathers.  Specifically, I re-examine the normative desirability of a 
property-based exclusion of biological fathers from pre-
established marital dyads.  With states presuming marital fathers 
as legal fathers,10 this inevitably deprives biological fathers of 
formal rights to children, vis-à-vis the tautological impossibility 
of not being married to the mother. Without articulated rights to 
the child, this renders the extramarital, biological father as 
                                               
7 WOODHOUSE at 1047. 
8 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972). 
9 CARPENTER ET AL at 1027.  
10 In some states, the marital presumption can be rebutted, but no natural 
right exists in the biological father that gives him standing. California’s Family 
Code section 7630 creates a standing rule for challenging paternity. The only 
parties entitled to bring an action are the child, the biological mother, and the 
presumed father.  Within this statute, the “father” of the child is determined as 
the man who married or attempted to marry the mother. Section 7630, 
subdivision (a), provides:  
"A child, the child's natural mother, or a man presumed to be the child's 
father under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 7611, may bring an action as 
follows: [P] (1) At any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the 
father and child relationship presumed under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of 
Section 7611. [P] (2) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father 
and child relationship presumed under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 7611 
only if the action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining 
knowledge of relevant facts. After the presumption has been rebutted, 
paternity of the child by another man may be determined in the same action, if 
he has been made a party." 
(citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7631 (West 2004). 
24-Mar-10] CHILDREN AS PROPERTY 6 
“untitled” in relation to the “titled” status of the mother’s 
husband.11  
 Children are property in the sense that classic ownership 
theory rigidly allows only one father.12 For claims of maternity, 
law defers to nature by declaring the biological mother13 the legal 
mother of the child, regardless of her marital status.14 Titled 
fathers with established legal rights to the child have protected 
interests of custody or visitation, and these interests most often 
stem from his relation by blood or marriage, absent a competing 
interest from a married man.15 However, the success of the 
father’s interest reveals a market value of marriage in 
establishing parental rights.16  On one hand, unmarried men 
cannot exercise paternal rights in the child solely based on a 
genetic link,17 because courts require a substantive development 
of a father-child relationship to establish due process rights.18  
Thus, even though a biological link exists between unmarried 
man and child, this alone fails to qualify him as a father.19  On the 
other hand, married men, regardless of a biological connection, 
are presumed as fathers of children born into the marriage.20 
 In complex families, traditional theory cannot adequately 
                                               
11 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) ("state laws almost 
universally express an appropriate preference for the formal family.") 
12 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 [hereinafter MICHAEL H’] (California 
law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.”)  
13 See Megan S. Calvo, Uniform Parentage Act—Say Goodbye to Donna 
Reed: Recognizing Stepmother’s Rights, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 773, 780-
82(2008) (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 15). Here, I limit 
my analysis to children of biological mothers who give birth and intend to keep 
the child.  This does not include biological mothers who relinquish their 
parental rights, or surrogates who have contracted to bring the child to term.  
14 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a) (2000 & Supp. 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 
(establishing the “mother-child relationship between a woman and a child”) 
with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (2000 & Supp. 2002), 9B U.L.A. 15 (presuming 
paternity based on marital status in father-child relationships). 
15 MICHAEL H. at 132; Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Evans v. 
Wilson, 856 A.2d 679, 696 (Md. 2004); Girard v. Wagenmaker, 470 N.W.2d 372, 
381 (Mich. 1991); B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368 (N.D. 1993); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 
P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000). 
16 Stanley supra note 8 at 645 (1972). See also Radin, at note 49, at 1862-63 
(citing Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1193, 1199 (1985)). 
17 Quilloin supra note 6 at 249 n.5 (1978); Caban  supra note 5 at 397 (1979). 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 MICHAEL H. at 110. 
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reflect nuanced webs of possession and exclusion that complicate 
a simple delineation of owner and nonowner.  Complex families 
have disunified articulations of group construction and varied 
interpretations of the validity of extramarital inter-
connectedness.21  In property disputes, multiple claimants each 
attest to a valid interest in property, yet their failure to produce 
convincing and recognized forms of evidence precludes them from 
obtaining standing.22   Nontitled litigants with legitimate interests 
in the contested property nevertheless do not fit into the existing 
visions of ownership.23  Quite literally, they fail to conform.  
 This Essay redirects the property/family discourse from 
constitutional exclusion to fiduciary inclusion.24   It joins in recent 
discussions of “stewardship” models of property that engage the 
complexities of nontitled claims to property, and it intends to 
start and continue a conversation on the conflict of parental 
rights and children’s best interests.25  While the traditional model 
of ownership is “fixed, possessed, controlled,” the stewardship 
model facilitates a “human and messy” assessment of property.26  
By highlighting the tangible claims of unwed fathers divested of 
standing to assert paternal rights, I suggest a turn to a fiduciary 
ethic that entertains the unique legal status of what I call the 
                                               
21 Complex families are unified by one element—the claim to a common 
child.  The mother’s status is not questioned, and the two fathers, both 
biological and legal/marital each assert an interest to parenthood. Disagreement 
exists as to whether such a structure is a family, at least from the perspective 
of the adults, but for the child, this conglomeration of relatives comprises a 
group of legal and genealogical relations, each maintaining an interest.  
22 Standing grants parties within the marital unit the ability to declare 
either the existence or nonexistence of the father-child relationship.  If and 
only if the named parties rebut the paternity presumption can another man be 
named a party to determine paternity. 
23 Dawn D. separated from her spouse, Frank F. in January 1995 and that 
same month, moved in with Jerry K. In February, Dawn became pregnant and 
remained with Jerry until returning to her marital home with Frank in April 
1995.  Jerry, the biological father of her child, attempted to secure his parental 
rights in August 1995 by filing a complaint to establish a parent-child 
relationship and obtain visitation rights.  The court ruled that Jerry did not 
have standing to challenge paternity because he had not developed a 
relationship with his biological child. Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 
1139, 1142 & n. 5 (Cal. 1998). 
24 See Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2401 (1995) (proposing a fiduciary ethic between parents and children).  
25 CARPENTER ET AL at 1028.  
26 Id. at 1109. 
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“complex family.”  This engagement of a textured—as opposed to 
flat and pedantic—model of the hybrid marital/nonmarital family 
recognizes the unwed father’s property rights in the child as 
untitled, while the marital unit acts as a fiduciary caregiver with 
legal rights to the child.  This model gives consideration to both 
biological and marital claims upon the child, while opening a 
possibility for other unrelated, nontitled interests.27  As my 
research shows, the best interests of children may be 
counterintuitively defeated by constitutional appeals that favor 
parents rather than children.   
 This Essay has three parts.  In Part I, I address the 
traditional model of property which is rooted in tenets of 
dominion and exclusion.  By examining canonical texts of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Jefferson, I offer the classic viewpoint of property as 
protective of stability.  I also introduce legal approaches on 
property by engaging the “property as personhood” theories of 
Laura Underkuffler and Margaret Jane Radin.  By demonstrating 
the link between person, property, and the state, I argue that the 
due process right of parents to make decisions about children 
(Troxel v. Granville) offers protection to recognized family forms.  
But this rigid rubric oversimplifies complex family structures that 
deserve a more nuanced and textured analysis of the child’s best 
interests.   
 Part II approaches the problem of the marital presumption 
of paternity.  By examining Supreme Court dicta regarding the 
rights of unmarried fathers (Michael H. v. Gerald D.) and 
biological parents (Troxel v. Granville), I make the case for 
complex families as liminal sites for balancing the best interests 
of children with the constitutional liberties of parents.  Biology 
does not grant one automatic standing for securing a legal interest 
in a child, which positively creates possibilities for variances 
based on relationship development.  But as case law 
demonstrates, this paves an overbroad opportunity for marriage 
to trump valid biological claims by controlling legal access to 
children, which impinges the opportunities of unwed fathers to 
develop necessary relationships. 
 Part III is the heart of the argument.  Here, I call for a 
stewardship model of property as a possibility for encompassing 
the intricate predicament of the complex family.  This fiduciary 
                                               
27 See Laura Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 
(considering friendship as a valid basis for family formation).  
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ethic aims to sidestep the binary problem of “untilled” unmarrieds 
and “titled” marrieds by assessing the needs of the child in tandem 
with the liberty interests of the parents.  At stake is the child’s 
interest in maintaining a beneficial relationship with her 
biological father.28  This model views the custodial, married 
parent as a fiduciary owing duties to both the child and the 
biological father.29  This accommodating model invokes a “web of 
interests”30 that displaces a traditional model of exclusivity and 
possession31 to present a more ethically sound interpretation of 
property and parenthood that accommodates the valid claims of 
biological fathers rather than dismissing them according to a 
statutory fiction. 
  
 
I. THE PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY 
 “There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, 
and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property,” 
wrote Blackstone.32  It is an unquestionable fact that the concept 
of property lies at the center of the foundation of political 
societies.  The rhetorical force and mythical fascination with the 
ownership of land and things begins with a delineation of “mine 
and thine”33 but ultimately assembles the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals within civil society.34 
Commentators have struggled and debated over countless aspects 
of property discourse, from private property to communal 
                                               
28 In Michael H., the plaintiff’s procedural due process claim was rejected 
because the majority saw no liberty interest present to be protected. In oral 
argument, when plaintiff’s counsel asserted that he would have had a right to 
be heard were he classified as a parent, the justices replied, “You're asking the 
state to create a liberty interest that he doesn't now have.” Oral Argument, 
Michael H. and Victoria D., Lexsee 1988 U.S. Trans Lexis 13. 
29 See Scott, supra note 24.  
30 CARPENTER AT AL at 1080 (citing Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The 
Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. 
Rev. 281 (2002)). 
31 Id. at 1125.  
32 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
33 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 58-59 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1651) 
(“There is no such thing as ownership, no legal control, no distinction between 
mine and thine. Rather, anything that a man can get is his for as long as he can 
keep it.”). 
34 Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: As Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 146 
(1990).  
24-Mar-10] CHILDREN AS PROPERTY 10 
property and to human property.35 Jennifer Nedelsky argues that 
property has a rhetorical power that distinguishes it from other 
legal entitlements.36  She notes that this concern is based upon a 
myth of property as the “quintessential instance of individual 
rights as limits to governmental power.”37 But property itself is 
hard to conceptualize under one single theory. “The idea of 
property is rather like an iceberg,” writes Kenneth Minogue.  “It is 
more complicated than it looks, and much of its significance is 
submerged.”38 
This significance is overlooked in the context of the family.  
Recognizing elements of property within the family generates 
uncomfortable discussions of people as chattel, and even more 
counterintuitive difficulties of children as property.  But statutory 
language, court opinions, and social rhetoric each articulate 
concepts of possession, protection, and exclusion that provoke 
elements of property. Ownership of property comes with a bundle 
of rights and expectations.  With this outlook, law provides safety 
and assurance of ownership to protect one’s holdings and to 
legitimate the basis of dominion. Yet in the context of the family, 
marriage secures this property interest.  Marriage establishes 
legal rights between unrelated adults, and in turn, it incites 
classifications of legitimate and illegitimate.39  Thus, blood and 
genetics alone do not determine paternity—law does.40 Family 
relationships existing beyond the recognition of law may exist in 
equity, but assertions of the rights and privileges that accompany 
                                               
35 See generally CARPENTER at 1022; Eduardo M. Penalver, Property as 
Entrance, 91 Va. L . Rev. 1889 (2005); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and 
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Carol M. Rose, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 
(1985); Underkuffler, supra note 34. 
36 Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of 
Private Property, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241, 253 (John Elster & 
Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (arguing for the mythical status that is awarded to 
the concept of property, and its relationship to changing notions of 
constitutionalism). 
37 Id. at 241. 
38 Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of Property and its Significance, in 
PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 1, 10 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 
1980). 
39 Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marriage Presumption: A Developed 
Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 370-73 (1988); see also John G. 
Culhane, Marriage Equality: First Justify Marriage If You Can, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 
485, 499-501(2009). 
40 Cheryl Harris, infra note 80, at 1730; Dallas, id.  at  371; Culhane, id.  at 
500. 
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paternity can only be acquired through marriage or filiation.41  
Technically speaking, paternity is positivistic rather than 
natural.42 To apply Cheryl Harris’s concept, the legal relationship 
marks the essential characteristic of family rights.43  
 
A.  Canonical Views  
 The beguiling force of property is so strong that the 
American founding fathers employed it as a reference point for 
the formation of the republic.  During the 1787 Federal 
Convention, Alexander Hamilton said that “the [o]ne great obj[ect] 
of Gov[ernment] is personal protection and the security of 
Property.”44  Its stronghold on political consciousness influenced 
the standard for which a person is inducted as a member into a 
political society.  Thomas Jefferson, the quintessential supporter 
of the agrarian state, shared this import.  Jefferson’s democratic 
dream idealized the small farm owner, envisioning the influential 
power of land as a means for instilling self-reliance and 
independence on the citizenry.   
Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people 
of God, if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts 
He has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and 
genuine virtue.  It is the focus in which he keeps 
alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape 
from the face of the earth.  Corruption of morals in 
the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no 
age nor nation has furnished an example.45 
Jefferson believed that political virtues could be transmitted more 
easily to people on small farms, “looking up to heaven, to their 
own soil and industry.”46  Such environments provided fertile 
grounds for elevating ordinary citizens into enlightened self-
government.47  These Arcadian communities comprised of 
                                               
41 Dallas, id., at 371-72; 381. 
42 Id. at 376-77; see also Harris, infra note 80, at 1731. 
43 Harris, infra note 80, at 1730. 
44 Underkuffler, supra note 34, at 133-34 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (M. Farrand ed., 1911). 
45 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ch. XIX, 259, in THE 
LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (A. Koch & W. Peden, eds. 
1993) [hereinafter JEFFERSON]. 
46 Id. 
47 A. Whitney Griswold, The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson, 40 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. Vol. 657, 672 (1995). 
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independent, upstanding yeoman farmers would permit minimal 
governmental influence.48  Such self-sufficient communities 
would be tightly knit, well informed, and well intentioned.  Under 
both Hamilton and Jefferson’s schemes, property serves as the 
conduit between citizen and the state.  
Certainly in social contract theory, the preservation of 
one’s property serves as the chief reason for leaving the state of 
nature and entering civil society.  Such sentiment commences in 
Hobbes, who posits the imposition of the sovereign (“the Great 
Leviathan”49) as the decisive force of prevention of the natural 
passions of humankind.  “The finall Cause, End, or Designe of...in 
the introduction of that restraint upon themselves...is the 
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life 
thereby...”50 He advocates this protective model of civil society as 
a talisman for curtailing domestic injury and preventing foreign 
invasion.51  To leave the state of nature, where life is “nasty, 
brutish, and short,” humankind must submit to the state which 
imposes order on competition and chaos.52  As the original social 
contractarian, Hobbes’ work sets the foundation upon which 
theories of the protection of “things” rests.  
 As a foil to Hobbes’s brutish vision of self-preservation, 
Locke offers a version of the social contract that posits 
preservation of property is its objective. Nothing in the Second 
Treatise commands the assiduous and deliberate attention as the 
concentration on property. “The great and chief end, therefore, of 
men’s uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under 
government is the preservation of their property.”53 Locke elevates 
the concept to a rather deific level, depicting property as a present 
from God to humankind. “God, who hath given the world to men 
in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the 
best advantage of life, and convenience.”54 Other political 
literature supported a divine right to property ownership.  A 1644 
English pamphlet declared that “God…hath…made us absolute 
                                               
48 Carl Becker, What is Still Living in the Political Philosophy of Thomas 
Jefferson, 48 AM. HIST. REV. 691, 698 (1943). 
49 HOBBES, supra note 33, at 227. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id., at Ch. XIII.  
53 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, 66 (C.B. Macpherson, ed 
1980.) (author’s emphasis) [hereinafter SECOND TREATISE]. 
54 Id. at 18 
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proprietors of what we enjoy, so that our lives, liberties, and 
estates doe not depend upon, nor are subject to, the sole breath or 
arbitrary will of our Soveraigne.”55  But Locke believes that the 
proper way to give thanks for this benevolent gift was the use of 
the land.  Property becomes one’s own through labor, which 
extracts the land or object from the common and reassigns it to 
the individual.56  Although efficiency and waste concerned him as 
well, his initial concern was manifest destiny.  “The earth, and all 
that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of 
their being.”57  Armed with this divine mission, Locke’s political 
actor was justified in making use of land. 
Ownership of things necessitates a fundamental and initial 
ownership of personhood.  To own property marks the antithesis 
of being its object.58 The person, for Locke, formed the central 
tenet of property, in that objects and things could not exist 
without the primary ownership of oneself.59 This embodiment 
theory of personhood melds individual and collective interests by 
centering the very possibility of ownership in one’s own body.  As 
the following sections demonstrate, the embodiment theory 
extends to the makeup of the family. 
 
B.  Personhood and Property 
The integration of political and personal rights makes sense 
in light of individual needs to recognize the interests of others in a 
common effort to secure property.  Laura Underkuffler argues 
that ultimately, property rights demand a confrontation between 
“competing selves and competing collectivities.”60  In her 
argument, absolute individual and group property rights cannot 
coexist.  In consideration of this fundamental conflict, one set of 
rights must concede to another.  The recognition of others’ rights 
allows for the development of “self in a context of relatedness to 
others.”61  In this respect, an individual right to property may only 
                                               
55 Underkuffler, supra note 34, at 138 (citing ENGLAND’S MONARCH OR A 
CONVICTION AND REFUTATION BY THE COMMON LAW OF THOSE FALSE PRINCIPLES…OF 
ALBERICUS…ETC. (London, 1644)). 
56 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 25, at ch. V, § 27. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at ch. IV.  
59 Locke argued that property began in oneself: “every man has a property 
in his own person.”  Id. at ch. V, § 27, at 134.  
60 Underkuffler, supra note 34, at 147. 
61 Id. 
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be reconciled with collective interests upon the revelation of the 
surrounding context which granted authority upon those rights.62 
Thus, the concept of absolute right contrasts with both the 
individual and the collective, which necessitates a comprehensive, 
integrated approach to property rights.  
Families operate in a similar structure.  Conflict may exist 
on two levels.  First, individual families do not exist 
independently of state regulation.  States continue to restrict who 
may marry, setting absolute prohibitions on age,63 
consanguinity,64 and in the majority of states, sex.65 States also 
may terminate parental rights for not supporting66 or educating 
their children67 and also punish partners and cohabitants for 
spousal abuse.68  Yet individual family decisions are protected by 
a zone of privacy69 that provides a constitutional guarantee of due 
process.  Individuals may purchase and use contraception70, 
maintain privacy of sexual intimacy71, and determine their own 
marital support.72  Each of these tiers of absolute rights would not 
coexist while sustaining their respective political identities.  
States do not completely own families and families certainly do 
not have dominion over the state.  But in their mutual 
antagonism, rights of personal and political property constrain the 
encroachment of the other. 
                                               
62 Id. 
63 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 89 (2d. ed. 1988). 
64  Id. at 82. 
65 Id. at 75-80. But see Ian Urbina, Gay Marriage is Legal in U.S. Capital, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/us/04marriage.html. 
66 CLARK, supra note 35, at 897. 
67 Id. at 898. 
68 Id. at 308. 
69 The concept of the penumbra of privacy was first articulated in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), where the Supreme Court opined, 
“that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance [and] . . . create zones 
of privacy.” 
70 Id. at 485-86; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55(1972). 
71 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
72 See In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1977); see also Rothman 
v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (N.J. 1974) (recognizing “the essential 
supportive role played by the wife in the home” and stating that she is “entitled 
to a share of family assets accumulated during the marriage”). 
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Secondly, the embodiment theory benefits families that 
accede to the law’s recognition of conjugality.  Through marriage, 
the legally recognized couple may engage in the state-recognized 
labor of marriage to declare themselves a family unit.  This effort 
gives the couple dominion over their conjugal relationship, to the 
exclusion of individuals in the outside world.  Although states, as 
discussed above, may regulate the rights and duties of husbands 
and wives, the family itself is left on its own.  Much like the state 
that envelops them, the family supersedes its smaller subjects.  In 
the effort to define a family, nonmarital labor is routinely 
outweighed by marital labor.  
 
C.  Property in the Family 
 While ancestry may create blood ties between individuals 
and groups, it fails to achieve equal recognition unless a legal 
acknowledgement confers a status of “related.”73  Legitimacy is a 
property interest entirely bestowed by law.74  It narrows a state 
definition of family by dictating the legal possibilities of family 
relationships upon which rights may be distributed.  Subject to 
state regulation, legitimacy has been denied to families based on 
sex75, ancestry76, and marital status. 77   While legitimate, married 
                                               
73 Dallas, supra note 55, at 372-73. 
74 See id. at 1724. 
75 Same sex couples who cannot marry face trouble in securing second 
parent adoptions, where the nonmarital partner (usually the nonbiological 
parent) adopts the child after the other adult partner has secured their legal 
rights to the child.  See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intuition, Morals, and the Legal 
Conversation About Gay Rights, 32 NOVA L. REV. 523, 531-32 (2008); Braschi v. 
Stahl Assocs, Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989); In re Kaufmann’s Will, 20 N.Y.S. 
2d 664 (1964). 
76 Kevin Noble Maillard, The Color of Testamentary Freedom, 62 SMU L. 
REV. 1783 (forthcoming 2009); see also Adrienne Davis, Slavery and the Roots 
of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 459-60 (C. 
MacKinnon & R. Siegel eds., 2006); Tanya Hernandez, The Racism of Sexual 
Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 479 (C. MacKinnon & R. 
Siegel eds., 2004); Jason Gillmer, Poor Whites, Benevolent Masters, and the 
Ideologies of Slavery: The Local Trial of a Slave Accused of Rape, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. 489, 541-42 (2007). 
77 Legitimacy is not an end goal for all.  Marriagefree couples and single 
persons may deliberately avoid state involvement in the act of labeling their 
intimate lives. See generally NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) 
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); Bella DiPaulo, Singled 
Out: How Singles Are Stereotyped, Stigmatized, and Ignored, and Still Live 
Happily Ever After (2007); The Alternatives to Marriage Project, 
http://www.unmarried.org.html. 
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families receive state and social recognition as a stable unit, 
unrecognized families default as illegitimate and legally 
nonexistent, which places value on marriage as the preferred 
method for constructing a family and relating to children. 
Conceptualizing marital family relationships as subjects of 
protection and preservation forces a review of competing rights.  
In addition to her work elucidating the subjectivity of property 
rights, Margaret Jane Radin attests to a hierarchy of property 
protection resulting from a social consensus of the importance of 
the property.78  Such a critique recognizes the moral import placed 
upon property as personhood, which could explain the conflicts of 
family composition as a property right.  Marriage, as the 
presumed means of reproduction, enables a redirection of 
biologically nonexistent relationships.  Biological fathers of 
children whose mother is married to another man traditionally 
lose attempts to gain parental rights.  If the unmarried father 
wishes to claim a right to the child—a property right—he cannot 
because statutory presumptions automatically assign paternity to 
the married father.79 This pretext disallows biological truth—it 
renders the unmarried father a legal stranger to the child.  
Because this father has no marital family property, he has no 
personhood as a parent.  He has been alienated80 from the product 
of his labor.   
 
1. Property in People 
 At common law, children were treated as chattel. As 
Barbara Woodhouse argues, dominion over children is a 
“paradigmatic American right”81 because it supports a notion of 
ownership that underscores the sovereignty of the family.  Like a 
piece of livestock, a pet, or a slave, judges treated living creatures 
as objects of exchange.82  Fathers “gave, assigned, and transferred” 
                                               
78 Radin, supra note 13, at 978. 
79 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West 2004). 
80 See MICHAEL H. at  119-26; see als Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, 
RESPONSE: Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1038 
(1996). For further discussion of alienation and property rights see Cheryl 
Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1731-34 (1995). 
81 WOODHOUSE AT 995.  
82 Property can be conceived of as “everything that has an exchangeable 
value.” AMJUR PROPERTY § 4 Pets are classified as personal property. 
Additionally, restitution damages are accorded to the owner for bearing the loss 
of the animal.  AMJUR ANIMALS § 117.  See generally, Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. 393 (1856) (ruling that a slave owner is entitled to recovery of slave 
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infants; mothers “bequeathed” children; and plaintiffs recovered 
children “possess[ed]” by others.83  As a human commodity, 
children’s’ rights receded behind the interests of parents.  For 
adults wanting to dispose, gain, or trade in the family market,84 
states deferred to the wishes of adults within their own domestic 
spheres.  
 This allows men to claim children as property.85  The use of 
“access” as a historical ground for presuming paternity invokes a 
property interest in marriage.  “Access” does not assign sexual 
agency to the wife.  Rather, it secures the expectation interests of 
husbands that interlopers cannot displace them as the sovereign 
of their private domain.86  Thinking of a man’s “home as a castle” 
assigns power to the domestic sovereign—the husband within the 
marital household—as a “king[] like fathers over their families.”87 
 State deference to resolving family matters highlights the 
political distinction between the public and private realm—a 
heavily gendered dichotomy that delineates the proper roles of 
men and women. Stereotypically, men lived as public creatures.88  
They worked outside the home, ran for public office, and 
represented their families to the outside world.89  The existence of 
a man in the public sphere enables and necessitates regulation of 
his interactions with others.90  Rights colliding with other rights 
                                                                                                                       
property.) 
83 WOODHOUSE supra note 67 at 1049.  
84 See generally, MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE 
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985); STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN 
KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 
(1988). 
85 To illustrate the rooted concept of market in family, English common law 
literally considered children to be personal property of their fathers. 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452-53 (cited in Jill Moore, Comment, Charting A 
Course Between Scylla And Charybdis: Child Abuse Registries And Procedural 
Due Process, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 2063, 2121 (1995). 
86 See MICHAEL H. at 124-27. 
87 WOODHOUSE at 1044.  
88 “The ideal to which women should strive was “Republican Motherhood,” 
in which women played the important role of breeding and rearing the men 
who performed in the public realm, in the process becoming guardians of the 
nation's morals.” Orlando Patterson, On the Provenance of Diversity, 23 YALE L. 
& POL'Y REV. 51, 56 (Winter 2005) 
89 See generally, NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD (2d ed. 1997).  
See also JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN (1993). 
90 This type of mutual and communal agreement forms the basis of most 
social contract theory. 
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forces the intervention of the referee state.91   
 But the domestic sphere conceivably has no competing 
interests within, so states feel less of a need to regulate.  Men 
retreat to this private realm to escape the competition of public 
life92, which makes home life possible.   Both public and private 
realms depend on each other for mutual support.   Yet domestic 
life is left alone by state control, leaving families subject to the 
individual desires of the household. Independence for household 
activities purported to facilitate marital harmony by disallowing 
legal intervention between husband and wife at common law93: 
wives cannot sue husbands for financial support94; spouses cannot 
testify against each other95; and men can rape their wives.96  
Without standing to hold men—that they are married to—
accountable for actions that others would be jailed for, women sit 
as prisoners of the protective immunity that supposedly promotes 
harmony.97 
 At common law, the separate existence of women was 
unknown,98 which legally precluded a man from granting any 
property to his wife, or even contracting with her.99 Under 
coverture, married women have no legal rights apart from men, 
and some commentators argue that they are seen as children of 
their husbands.100 Husbands took responsibility for women’s 
domestic and legal lives, which included management of their 
property, money, rights, and children.101  Middle class married 
women 102 lived in a marked state of total economic dependency, a 
                                               
91 See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, infra note.  
92 MAEVE DOGGETT, MARRIAGE, WIFE-BEATING AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN 
ENGLAND 90 (1993) 
93 Id. at 79. 
94 McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226 (1953) (holding that spouses must 
separate or divorce to recover support, but not during the marriage)  
95 Dan Markel, Jennifer Collins, Ethan Leib, Criminal Justice And The 
Challenge Of Family Ties, 2007 UILLR 1147 (2007).  See also, Malinda L. 
Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and 
Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. Rev. 1032 
96 Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1375 (2000).  
97 Id. 
98 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at 441. 
99
 Id. at 442. 
100 DOROTHY M. STETSON, A WOMAN’S ISSUE: THE POLITICS OF FAMILY LAW 
REFORM IN ENGLAND 5 (1982). 
101 Id. at 3. 
102 Elite women in England often exhibited independence from their 
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fact which Jane Lewis argues “made the denial of autonomy 
logical.”103 In this sense, married women women exist as 
counterparts of a primary male figure within their domestic 
sphere. Because her property became his property, and systems of 
patriarchy prioritized his rights over hers, the woman could not 
dispose of her lands without her husband’s consent.104  If the wife 
had any chattels entering into the marriage, these objects became 
the husband’s, who was entitled to make them his own.105  The 
wife was entitled to land in fee simple, although this property 
became the husband’s, who “thereupon [was] entitled to take the 
fruits and profits of the land during the marriage, and this right 
he [could] alienate to another.”106  As “guardians of the vestal 
flame,” men enjoyed the domestic supremacy which secured their 
position as legally-empowered rulers of the home.107 One historian 
claims that “Her liberation would be an infringement of his 
rights.”108  
 This allusion to the Roman paterfamilias favors male 
interests in marriage.109  In ancient Rome, the head of house, 
alone, assumed the legal identity of the entire family,110 and the 
state deferred to the authority of the paterfamilias in the 
regulation of the domestic sphere.111  At the head of the family, the 
paterfamilias represents himself, women, and children, as a 
unitary domestic entity with undivided interests.  There, the civil 
                                                                                                                       
husbands in maintaining their separate property. Upper-class women were the 
exception to the traditional, legally authoritative rule.  For further reading on 
the history of married women and separate property, see e.g., SUSAN STAVES, 
MARRIED WOMEN’S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN ENGLAND, 1660-1833 (1990). 
103 JANE LEWIS, WOMEN IN ENGLAND 1870-1950: SEXUAL DIVISIONS AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 119 (1984). 
104 LEWIS, WOMEN IN ENGLAND AT 121.  Also, Pollock notes that, at common 
law, “The wife ha[d] during the marriage no power to alienate her land without 
her husband’s concurrence.” FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 
2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, ch. VII § 2, at 404 
(2d ed. 1899). 
105 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 404. 
106 Id. at 407. 
107 ROBERT CECIL, LIFE IN EDWARDIAN ENGLAND 158 (1969). 
108 Id. 
109 WOODHOUSE at 1044.  
110 Thus, single women remained under their father’s care until marriage.  
See, WOODHOUSE.  
111 Thomas Tucker, Sources of Louisiana’s Law of Persons: Blackstone, 
Domat, and the French Codes, 44 Tul. L. Rev 264, 267 (1970). 
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domain ended, and the private unit of the family began.112  
Distinguished by his complete ownership of everything within the 
household, the paterfamilias could sell personal, real, and human 
property, which includes wives, children, and slaves.113  
 Middle-class married women114, as subjects in the private 
realm of their husbands, did not participate in the marketplace (or 
the court, for that matter) on the same footing as men.  In this 
sense, women exist as counterparts of a primary male figure 
within their domestic sphere.  
 “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: 
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporates 
and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose 
wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything[.]115 
 Centralization of power within a single person simplified 
what may have been a complex network of persons.  Robert 
Ellickson notes that this illiberal, hierarchical structure reduced 
transaction costs of managing family and domestic affairs, while 
expediting exchanges with third parties.116 Although 
contemporary liberal societies no longer rest upon this feudal 
scheme, American norms of marriage and family reify the notions 
of kinship organization and structural clarity. Within the 
structure of the paterfamilias, dealings with outsiders were 
lateral—that is, they occurred through the consent of the family 
unit, which culminated within a single person.   Of course, 
contemporary American society objects to the selling of human 
beings, but the independence accorded to the family engenders 
rights of possession and exclusion that facilitate the regulation of 
access to the individual domestic sphere.  
 
                                               
112 Id. at 267.  
113 Boris Kozolchyk, Transfer Of Personal Property By A Nonowner: Its 
Future In Light Of Its Past, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1453, 1462 (1987). 
114 Elite women in England often exhibited independence from their 
husbands in maintaining their separate property.  Although the Schlegels and 
the Wilcoxes may be considered elite, it is the symbolic masculinity of property 
that Forster critiques, which applies generally to the English resistance of 
married women’s legal autonomy.  Upper-class women were the exception to 
the traditional, legally authoritative rule.  For further reading on the history of 
married women and separate property, see e.g., STAVES, supra note 97. 
115 Id. at 441. 
116 Robert Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights 
Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L. J. 226, 316 (2006) 
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2. Property in Family 
 Paternity is a labor of defining parental roles, and while it 
determines who may have access to the child, it also dictates who 
may set those parameters.117  The Supreme Court has deferred to 
parental autonomy as an inviolable prerogative of due process. 
Decision-making capacity, for the parent of the child, includes the 
liberty interest to “make decisions concerning the care, custody, 
and control of their children.”118 This includes the power of 
exclusion, which when established, empowers the parent to forbid 
other relatives, including grandparents, from asserting visitation 
rights.119 If the family—in the simplified legal sense of it—decides 
to exclude access to the child, it stimulates one of the “oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests.”120 
 Troxel v. Granville declared unconstitutional a Washington 
State statute that allowed third party nonparents to petition for 
visitation rights if it served the best interest of the child.121  This 
would have allowed any person, such as a caregiver, friend, or 
relative to petition the court for visitation.  The Troxels, paternal 
grandparents of Granville’s daughter, moved to uphold the 
statute.  The Supreme Court rejected this as a violence of due 
process because it supplanted the parents’ wishes with a judge’s 
ruling of the child’s best interests.122  Although the lower court 
declared that no adverse affects would stem from grandparent 
visitation, the High Court ruled that Granville’s decision to limit 
visitation deserved material weight. 
 Depending on one’s standpoint, the best interests standard 
takes on different meanings.  For Granville, the state’s support of 
third-party visitation replaced her parenting preferences with the 
courts’.123  As a fit parent of the child, the mother wanted the state 
to withdraw from her private realm of paternal decisionmaking, 
which would allow her to act autonomously in regards to child 
deployment.  The state and the grandparents, in opposition, 
viewed the sole reliance on the mother’s wishes as flawed and 
parent-centered. This argument maintains that best interests 
                                               
117 Biological mothers are categorically declared as mothers of their 
children, regardless of their marital status.  
118 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (2000). [hereinafter ‘TROXEL’] 
119 Id. at 67.  
120 Id. at 65.  
121 Id. at 67. 
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
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should include extended family members, who also impact the life 
of the child. Leaving this decision solely to the parent runs the 
risk of unfounded exclusions and boundless denials that 
universally jeopardize the visitation interests of all nonparents 
and of the child.124  From this angle, severing ties between 
grandparent and grandchild distorts fundamental liberty as the 
mother’s ability to determine the best interest of the parent.  
 But strict deference to the legitimate authority of the 
parental veto mistakenly conflates liberty and children’s 
interests.125  It fails to acknowledge that the child’s best interest 
may exist separately of the desires of the parent.  This difficult 
conflict between parents, both legal and biological, forestalls the 
preservation of relationships that may benefit the child.  This is 
particularly pertinent in the context of extramarital paternity.  
Despite a status as a biological parent, the marital presumption 
classifies the unwed father as a legal stranger.126 Even though 
third parties may have strong attachments to a child, the legal 
parent may restrict access: without reasons, without 
accountability.127  The ability to exclude all others—grandparents, 
and caregivers, in addition to biological parents—allows the 
marital parent alone to determine the best interests of the child to 
the exclusion of others with pertinent interests.  Courts restrain 
from questioning the instability of objective decision making: bad 
or good, parental judgment wins. 
 
3. Property in the Complex Family 
 Legitimacy not only describes the status of the child, it also 
characterizes marriage as the sanctioned channel for men 
establishing rights in children. Legitimacy provides access to the 
child, just as the husband is presumed to have access to the wife 
at her moment of conception.128 For the great majority of families, 
                                               
124 Disallowing this type of established relationship favors married 
parents—under the cover of legitimacy—but the majority, Justice Kennedy 
argues, overlooks the potential harm inflicted upon the child.  TROXEL at 94 
(Kennedy, diss.).  
125 Id. at 96.   
126 “The law effectively has constructed a parent/stranger dichotomy in 
which one is either a parent, vested with the rights and responsibilities of 
caregiving, or one is a legal stranger without legal entitlements or obligations.”  
Murray, supra note 8 at 399.  
127 TROXEL at 72. 
128 “Traditionally, that presumption could be rebutted only by proof that a 
husband was incapable of procreation or had had no access to his wife during 
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paternity is less scrutinized and contested.  But for multiparent 
kinship structures129 that simultaneously produce children130 
inside and outside of marriage, the Manichean, property-based 
discourse of parent and child fails to acknowledge difference. By 
restricting the term “family” to the spousal unit without including 
the third party furthers a collective rejection of families that 
deviate from a marital norm.  Perhaps these families do not wish 
to self-label as nontraditional or complex, but calling these 
tangled webs of relationship something other than a family 
undergirds the legal fiction of the genetically pure marital unit.  
Ignoring the extramarital relationship and its human output only 
feeds a dishonesty of paternity that allows the societally and 
legally condoned family to cocoon itself from germane 
confrontation. Not only are children declared illegitimate, but also 
the multi-layered family structure that produced them. 
 Objectively speaking, terming this web of related people a 
complex family admittedly reprograms an understanding of 
caregiving and relating by eroding the familial normativity of a 
two-parent binary.131  To call an interrelationship of one woman, 
two men, and the children between them a family recognizes the 
                                                                                                                       
the relevant period.”  MICHAEL H. at 124.  
129 A number of scholars have addressed the legal status of nontraditional, 
nonnucelar families.  See, John DeWitt Gregory, Family Privacy and the 
Custody and Visitation Rights of Adult Outsiders, 36 FAM. L.Q. 163 (2002): 
Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering 
Polyamory, 31 CAP. UNIV. L. REV. 439 (2003); Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy's 
Law: Compulsory Monogamy And Polyamorous Existence 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004); Laura Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits? 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 189 (2007); Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the 
Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-
Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. 275 (1999); and Melissa Murray, supra 
note 8.  "This limitation excludes a variety of potential multiparent or blended 
familial structures made possible through use of assisted reproduction, 
especially among gays and lesbians." Lee-Ford Tritt, Technical Correction Or 
Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories Under The New Uniform 
Probate Code, 61 ALLR 273, 315 (2010). 
130 Scholars have also investigated the impact of reproductive techniques, 
such as artificial insemination and surrogacy on claims to parenthood.  While 
these studies address important issues that illuminate a discussion on children 
as property, I limit my article to sexually intimate reproduction to focus on the 
interrelationships between married and unmarried adults.  See Janet Dolgin, 
Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV. 347 (2008). 
131 See Murray, supra note 8 at 207. (“most courts have remained fixed on 
the concept that parenthood is exclusive and may only be shared by two 
people”). 
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difficult complexity of relations while acknowledging an unnamed 
reality of domestic life.  Certainly this does not advocate or 
promote a polyandrous vision of parenthood.132  It does not decry 
marriage as inherently exclusive or injurious to modernity.  
Instead, it grounds the discussion within an epistemic possibility 
of who can be related to the child, and how this acknowledgment 
can promote the interests of that child.  Rather than allowing 
conflicts of paternity to persist as disputes over property, this 
turns attention to the utility of paternity to the child.  
 Critics of this conceptualization of the complex family may 
argue that it erodes parental authority by inviting the interests of 
third parties.  States limit the number of parents for each child to 
two, and generally do not provide legal recognition of additional 
persons. Even if the two parent family consented to additional 
parents, the mutual agreement remains legally invalid.  In oral 
argument for Michael H., the Court questioned the possibility of a 
“menage a trois” family structure that would “introduce[s] [the 
lover] into the structural relationship of the marriage.”133  This act 
of including the biological father would “create a liberty interest 
that he doesn’t now have.”134  
 Case law generally refrains from granting recognition of 
unrelated persons as family.  In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 
the Supreme Court held that a group of college students living 
together in a house failed to meet the Village’s definition of 
“family.”  Although the students argued that they operated 
together as a family unit, they were still unrelated individuals 
sharing living space rather than a family deserving recognition of 
their fundamental rights. The Court held that the Village had a 
rational reason for restricting occupancy to families, a limitation 
which promotes communities where “family values, youth values, 
and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a 
sanctuary for people.”135  Because the group did not constitute a 
family, the ordinance did not affect a fundamental right.  
 Housing ordinances generate different constitutional effects 
when blood relations link the residents together.  Although 
                                               
132 Id. at note 211. (“the limited expansion of marriage to include same-sex 
couples has not led to including other historically excluded groups like 
consanguineous relatives and those in polyamorous relationships”). 
133 Michael H. V. Gerald D Oral Argument transcript, 1988 U.S. Trans. 
LEXIS 13, 10.  
134 Michael H. Oral Argument at 16.  
135 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). 
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extended families do not comprise a traditional nuclear family, 
the Court recognizes a fundamental right of blood relatives to live 
under the same roof.   In Moore v. City of East Cleveland136, the 
Court ruled unconstitutional a housing ordinance that limited 
occupancy of a dwelling unit to a single family, which would have 
disqualified a woman living with her son and grandsons.137  The 
State’s narrow definition of family deprived the plaintiff  of a 
fundamental right.   This violation of substantive Due Process—
the “intrusive regulation of the family”138-- permits some 
combinations of relatives to live together while denying the same 
protections to others.  In placing value judgments on acceptable 
family arrangements, the ordinance under-includes blood 
relatives.139 
 These two housing cases, Belle Terre and Moore, complicate 
traditional definitions of family.  Even though neither case 
presents a nontraditional family in the strict sense, both offer 
examples of legal accommodation (or rejection) of nonnuclear 
families.  Occupancy laws articulate conceptions of the family 
that challenge subjective beliefs in domestic life.  These cases 
force an examination of the core principles that legitimate the 
existence of family.  
 But complex families generate a problem with recognition 
because law fails to recognize multiple paternity.  Marital 
presumptions of paternity block the unmarried father from 
asserting rights in the child, leaving him as the sole party 
asserting the possibility of complexity.  If law traditionally sees 
only one father, he becomes a legal stranger to the child, and he 
cannot impose upon the marital unit any rights to membership.  
Only with the consent of the married couple140 does the complex 
                                               
136 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
137 Id. ("The ordinance here expressly selects certain categories of relatives 
who may live together and declares that others may not, in this instance 
making it a crime for a grandmother to live with her grandson.") 
138 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). 
139 Justice Brennan’s dissent emphasizes the ordinance’s restrictive view on 
family: "zoning power is not a license for local communities to enact senseless 
and arbitrary restrictions which cut deeply into private areas of protected 
family life. East Cleveland may not constitutionally define 'family' as 
essentially confined to parents and the parents' own children." Moore v. E. 
Cleveland at 507. 
140 The marital presumption can be rebutted by the husband, or by the 
wife—in tandem with the acknowledgement of paternity by the biological 
father. “The presumption may be rebutted by blood tests, but only if a motion 
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family become legally visible, because they admit and recognize 
the unmarried father’s paternity.  Such support of family privacy 
ensures the liberty interests of married couples while fulfilling the 
protective promises of marriage.141 However, this protection 
directly serves the property interests of adults while indirectly 
serving the interests of the child.  The absence of a macroanlysis 
of the complex family undergirds the legal fiction of the 
simplified, nuclear family within a context that clearly disproves 
it.  
 
 
 
II. MARITAL PRESUMPTIONS OF PATERNITY: MICHAEL H. VS. GERALD 
D. 
 In 1981, a former model named Carole gave birth to a baby 
girl, Victoria, in Los Angeles.142  Carole had married Gerald five 
years earlier and they lived together in an apartment on the 
beach.  At Victoria’s premature, c-section birth, Gerald joined 
Carole in the delivery room and remained with her and Victoria as 
the newborn was admitted to critical care.143  Upon Victoria’s 
healthy recovery, she came home to the beach apartment and 
lived with Gerald, who assumed many primary caretaker 
responsibilities.144  
 Beginning in October 1981, Carole moved with Victoria to a 
number of cities on an average of every three months.  She 
separated from Gerald in October 1981, moved to the Virgin 
Islands to live with Michael from January 1982 to March 1982, 
and then reuniting with Gerald in New York in the spring of 1982.   
In May 1982, Gerald learned that he was not Victoria’s biological 
father. Michael, who lived near the couple in Los Angeles, had 
been Carole’s extramarital lover in Los Angeles. Blood tests145 
revealed a 98.07% probability that Michael D was the father.  
Nevertheless, Gerald continued to live with Carole in New York 
and also in Europe, through the fall of 1982.  At the same time, 
                                                                                                                       
for such tests is made, within two years from the date of the child's birth, 
either by the husband or, if the natural father has filed an affidavit 
acknowledging paternity, by the wife.”  MICHAEL H. at 115. 
 
142 MICHAEL H. at. 113. 
143 Declaration of Gerald Dearing, 1987 U.S. Briefs 746, *2 (1987).  
144 Id.  
145 MICHAEL H., at 114.  
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Carole continued a relationship in Los Angeles with Scott, who 
demands no rights to Victoria, until March 1983.   
 Carole and Gerald, as a married couple, did not live 
together permanently, and she lived independently of Gerald 
during the times when they were apart.  In the periods that Carole 
lived with Michael in St. Thomas, VI, she held herself out as his 
wife and the mother of his child, even through her legal ties 
stayed open with Gerald.146  During this period in the Caribbean, 
Victoria called Michael “Daddy.”147  She then returned to New 
York in the summer and fall of 1982 to reconcile with Gerald.   
 That fall, in November of 1982, Carole forbade Michael 
from seeing Victoria, and he responded by filing a filiation action 
to establish paternity and secure visitation rights.148  The 
California court appointed a guardian ad litem in March 1983 to 
represent Victoria’s interests, who filed a cross-complaint to 
maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald.149   
Carole filed for summary judgment in May 1983, returning to 
Gerald in New York. 
 In the following years prior to litigation, Carole vacillated 
between stipulating Michael’s paternity and reconciling with 
Gerald.150  Carole traveled to Los Angeles, independently of Gerald, 
in the summer of 1983, and withdrew her summary judgment 
motion.  She and Victoria lived intermittently with Michael, and 
they considered themselves a family, even signing a stipulation of 
his paternity in April 1984.151  However, Carole recanted this 
stipulation and returned to Gerald in New York in June. 
 This final move prompted Michael and Victoria (through 
her guardian ad litem) to seek visitation rights pendente lite.  
Gerald moved for summary judgment in October 1984, citing 
section 621 of the California Evidence Code that no triable issue of 
fact existed regarding Victoria’s paternity.152  The law relied on 
marital status as a definitive proxy for paternity by presuming 
that “the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not 
impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the 
                                               
146 Id. at 114-15. 
147 Id. at 119.  
148 Id. at 114.  
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 115.  
152 Id. at 101. 
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marriage.”153  Only two people could rebut the marital 
presumption: the husband or the wife, following an 
acknowledgement by the biological father.154  This action must be 
taken within two years after the child’s birth. 
 Michael holds that the presumption violates procedural due 
process because it denies him a hearing on the issue of his 
paternity.  It terminates any legal relationship between Michael 
and Victoria by tautologically rejecting the legal interests of an 
unmarried party.  Moreover, Michael can claim no standing to 
object to Gerald’s paternity, which renders him legally unable to 
proceed.  The Supreme Court held that Michael had no 
constitutionally protected liberty interest to maintain his father-
daughter relationship with Victoria.155  Under California law, 
biological paternity is irrelevant within the context of marriage.  
For children born into wedlock, the husband assumes, to the 
exclusion of all others, legal responsibility for any children.156  
 California articulates three state interests for maintaining 
the marital presumption.157 First, presuming marital children as 
fathered by the husband promotes family privacy.  The state 
defers to the marital status of the couple as a determinant of 
intention to bear children and assume responsibility for their 
well-being.  At the same time, it protects and discourages 
interrogation into the intimate sexual life of the couple.  The 
presumption grafts a legal potency on the husband, which 
dispenses with an intrusive examination of his sterility, sexual 
frequency, and whereabouts.158 Secondly, it assures that the child 
will have a legal father, regardless of the biological parentage. It 
erases the ambiguity and anticipation of the nonmarital father’s 
accession to paternity.  In this way, the assurance of paternity 
                                               
153 Id. (citing CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. ß 621(a) (West Supp. 1989)). 
154 Id. at 115.  
155 Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 
UCLA L. REV. 637, 666 (1993).  
156 MICHAEL H., at 103.  
157 Appellee identifies the state interests pertinent to this case as follows: 
1. Promoting marriage; 
2. Maintaining a relationship between the child and the mother's husband; 
3. Protecting the privacy and integrity of the family relationship. 
Reply Brief of Appellant Michael H, 1987 U.S. Briefs 746. 
158 “As explained by Blackstone, nonaccess could only be proved "if the 
husband be out of the kingdom of England (or, as the law somewhat loosely 
phrases it, extra quatuor maria [beyond the four seas]) for above nine months . . 
. ." Id. at 125.  
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ensures that the child will have financial support and rights to 
inheritance and succession.159   Thirdly, this promotes “peace and 
tranquility of States and families” by preventing third parties 
from challenging the paternity of the legally recognized family.160 
Even if the claim were biologically valid, it removes the marital 
family unit from the threat of challenges to its composition.  
 This Section examines the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
unmarried fathers rights in their biological children.  This 
analysis reveals a disjuncture between biology and fatherhood, 
with the court affording rights for unwed, active fathers in a 
noncompetitive context.  That is, when rights to children do not 
pose a threat to marriage, courts uphold fathers’ interests as long 
as they have demonstrated a commitment to fatherhood beyond a 
genetic link.  This may be viewed as an embrace of nonmarital 
fathers’ rights by favoring action over status, but as my research 
shows, it sustains a notion of status as instrumental in the 
determination of paternity.  
                                               
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
 Developments in the legal history of the family perennially 
demonstrate the changing idea of the American family.  Certainly, 
a substantial number of scholars advocate a matching of law and 
social practice, which would eliminate the ideological cleavage 
between what law allows families to be and what they really 
are.161  Such a closing of the legal gap dispenses with upholding an 
ideal of the family that, in most cases, is no longer a majority of 
domestic arrangements.162  However, critics of this shift in 
cultural values denounce a possibility of law parroting social 
developments. 163  From this angle, law, not persons, should set 
the standard for regulating and defining the family.  
 This latter view is highly problematic because it encourages 
and maintains a static view of the private sphere.  Rights are 
premised upon initial eligibility as one whose interests deserve 
protection.  Inherently, this protective model of the family 
operates under an ideology of resistance, concomitant with a 
political objective of conservation. The thing trying to be saved is 
the past, or at least a perception of it.164  What has already 
occurred, in regards to the family, influences what will occur in 
the future. 
                                               
161 See, e.g., Kevin Noble Maillard, The Color of Testamentary Freedom, 62 
SMU L. REV. 101, 114 (2009); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: 
Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 385,  390-394 (2008); Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: 
Reframing Identity-Based Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873 
(2008); Laura A. Rosenbury,  Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 201 
(2007); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and 
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004). 
162 A slim majority of American households are maintained by married, 
different-sex couples: 52%.  The other 48% consists of single households, 
unmarried partners of same and different sex. 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=1&ved=0CAoQFjA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.census.gov%2Fprod%2F2003pubs%2Fcensr-
5.pdf&rct=j&q=census+of+households+married&ei=RSGnS7elIsX6lwfQ0pW
KCQ&usg=AFQjCNEcKTCc3bjNMFxWyNq2rraLpvRaEA 
163 See Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage As the Union of a Man and 
a Woman, 83 N. Dak. L. Rev. 1365 (2007).  See, generally, JAMES Q WILSON, THE 
MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES (2002); See also, 
The Institute for American Values, http://www.americanvalues.org/index.html; 
The National Institute for Marriage, 
http://www.nationalmarriage.com/ourpurpose.asp; The National Marriage 
Institute, http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/mission.html.  
164 See, generally, STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN 
FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (2000).  
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 Conceptualizing unmarried fathers’ rights forces a 
reexamination of the past in paternity decisions.  Holding true to 
the majority may uncover traditions and conditions of the past 
that sharply conflict with contemporary life.  It is unclear what 
kind of a past was meant by the Court, and which one of these 
legal customs are rendered invalid.  Seriously engaging the past 
would justify slavery165, restrict women,166 and criminalize 
sodomy.167  It would also bridge past and present by regenerating 
the concept of children as property and also of nonrecognition of 
unmarried fathers. 
 Although the marital presumption of the husband’s 
paternity may be rebutted by the wife, she must do this in concert 
with the formal acknowledgment of the biological father.  Carole’s 
role as wife, however wandering, is highly dependent on the three 
men in her life.168 But Carole’s role in this case is minimal in 
comparison with the paternity interests of the two men.  Michael 
H’s interest in Victoria is blocked by Gerald’s marital status. 
Despite the blood test and close proximity of their homes169  
Gerald can still displace Michael H as the only willing and legally 
able parent to care for the child.  Actual knowledge is legally 
revised to reflect a fictional knowledge—law renders biological 
                                               
165 Dred Scott V. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). (“The question before us is, 
whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a 
portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We 
think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be 
included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim 
none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and 
secures to citizens of the United States.”) 
166 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (excluding women from 
suffrage).  
167 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Denying the extension of 
fundamental rights to homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy: “to claim that 
a right to engage in such conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is, at best, facetious”).   
168 The psychologist in the case found that Carole sought validation and 
adventure in her relationships with men.  Evaluation by Norman and Susan 
Stone (Sept. 24, 1984).  
169 Carole’s address was 6401 Ocean Walk; Michael’s was 6407.  During the 
time that Gerald lived in Los Angeles, Michael lived next door. Michael attests: 
“Carole told me that she and Gerald were using separate bedrooms with her 
bedroom being the one in the back of the apartment, the one I could see from 
my nearby apartment.  Carole would wave to me each night we were not 
together from her bedroom and allowed me to watch while she readied herself 
for, and got into, her bed.” Declaration of Michael Hirschensohn, December 27. 
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fact impossible.  Legitimacy, fortified by legal presumptions and 
prohibitions, allows judges to make legal conclusions about the 
contours of the family that are simply untrue.  Yet, tradition, as 
an accumulation of cultural values revered by society, dictates a 
path of resistance for stray branches of the family tree. Without a 
history of recognizing the seemingly unusual family branches, law 
redraws the past to conform with the mandates of tradition. 
 In Michael H., the Court resisted the biological father’s due 
process claim by calling on tradition as a basis for upholding laws 
favoring the marital family.  Legitimacy, as a “fundamental 
principle of the common law,”170  uniformly favored the husband 
for paternity, save times of physical incapacity.  The plurality 
explains nonaccess by citing Blackstone:  “if the husband be out of 
the kingdom of England [beyond the four seas] for above nine 
months.”171 Thus, if the husband is within physical proximity of 
the wife at the time of conception, his legal status qualifies him as 
father.  At common law, the pro-husband approach to wifely 
access ensured double sexual dominion over the spouse: the 
husband, in some states, could kill his wife’s adulterous 
partners172 and claim any children that she bore as his. 
 Pitting the rights of unmarried, biological fathers against 
married, nonbiological fathers represents no tradition that favors 
what the court calls “adulterous natural fathers.”173  Implicit in 
the majority opinion lies a judicial denouncement of cuckoldry.174  
Courts often empathize with men whose marital rights are 
compromised by infidelity. Prioritizing nonmarital assertions over 
marital expectations, according to the majority opinion, 
undermines judicial continuity by departing from the rule of 
law.175 Because no previous court had favored adultery over 
marriage, the Court concluded that such a departure would 
impose arbitrary decision-making that would “permit judges to 
dictate rather than discern the society’s views.”176 
 In order for the biological father to gain substantive 
parental rights to baby Victoria, he must prove that the state has, 
                                               
170 Id. at 124.  
171 Id. 
172 Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 195, 235 (1986).  
173 Id. at 120.  
174 Id. at 124. 
175 Michael H., 491 U.S. at fn127 n. 6.  
176 Id.  
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in the past, trumped biology over law.  To succeed in his claim, 
Michael must demonstrate that courts protect the interests of 
unmarried fathers. The Supreme Court relays that no other cases 
(“We are not aware of a single case[s],”)177 address this issue, 
which justifies a denial of due process to such parties.  By this 
premise, access to due process rests upon its preexistence.  The 
Court does not enforce a perfect factual fit to recognize the 
tradition, yet it would consult more general treatments to 
illuminate the presence of judicial inquiry.  
 The Court insists that no historical and legal rationalization 
exists that gave rights to unmarried fathers.  Without such a 
precedent, the court ruled that factual scenarios like Michael H’s 
failed to resemble family relationships “so deeply imbedded 
within our traditions as to be a fundamental right.”178  Without a 
tradition of adulterous fathers (as the court characterizes and 
emphasizes) having a protected interest in biological children, 
there is no fundamental right for the Court to preserve.179  
 If substantive due process materializes from “conduct 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’”180, it 
mummifies a conception of rights previously treaded by 
successful litigants.  In foreclosing constitutional development, 
the majority imposes a static concept of rights by recycling dicta 
to the detriment of new facts, circumstances, and conflicts.  In 
Michael H’s dissent, Justice Brennan criticizes the majority’s 
articulation of tradition as “nothing more idiosyncratic or 
complicated than pouring through dusty volumes on American 
history.”181  For a textured and complex web of relationships in 
Michael H, the specific reliance on tradition would find no 
possibility of recognizing and entertaining the interests of the 
unmarried father.  As the dissent argues, previous cases would 
have different outcomes, limiting due process to the confirmation 
of “interests already protected by a majority of the States.”182 
 
B.  The Unstable Rights of Man 
 Traditionally, family law does not flatter men as fit for 
                                               
177 Id. at 127.  
178 Id. at 125.  
179 Id. at 128.  
180 Id. citing Bowers v. Hardwick.  
181 Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
182 Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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raising children alone.183 In Stanley v. Illinois, a state statute 
presumed unfitness for unmarried fathers upon the death of the 
children’s mother. Upon the death of his nonmarital partner, Peter 
Stanley lost custody of his three children.184  With the absence of 
marriage between the mother and father, Illinois declared that the 
children became wards of the state. No hearing was scheduled, 
and he had not abused or neglected the children in his 18 years as 
an unmarried father.  Yet, his marital status proved neglect, as 
the state argues, because he had not formalized his relationship 
with his partner or his children.185 Illinois’ termination scheme 
depicts unmarried as unsuitable, and it also presumes that 
surviving fathers have an insubstantial interest in raising 
children. 
 Termination of parental rights would not occur for 
surviving mothers of deceased fathers, however, because the state 
assumes both her maternity and fitness.  The unfitness 
presumption, by automatically severing the father-child 
relationship, places a higher burden of proof on unmarried men to 
assert a right to parenthood.  Father’s rights persist as long as the 
mother remains alive; she is the life in being by which his 
parental tenancy is measured.186  Upon her death, the unmarried 
father’s rights terminate because statutory construction fails to 
include him as “parent.” 187  
 The Court declined to assess the state’s interest in the 
“protection” of children from unmarried fathers in favor of a 
procedural due process analysis.  Regardless of Illinois’ 
                                               
183 At common law, the tender years presumption favored mothers in 
custody placements. Amjur. Evid. Section 248 (“A “tender years” presumption 
favoring a mother over a father has been held to represent an unconstitutional 
gender-based classification that discriminates between fathers and mothers 
solely on the basis of sex.  However, some courts still recognize a presumption 
in custody cases that a mother is generally better suited to raise a young child, 
although the “presumption” is treated more like a factor, among many factors, 
in determining custody issues.”). Currently, the majority of states do not base 
custody determinations on gender, but on a nexus of factors including, but not 
limited to, the best interest of the child, the primary caregiver, the stability of 
the home environment, and the parental abilities of the custodian.  
184 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972) 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 645. (dictating Illinois statute that upon the death of the mother in 
an unmarried household, the children become wards of the state). 
187 Id. at 650. ("Parents…means the father and mother of a legitimate child, 
or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and 
includes any adoptive parent[.]"  
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substantive motivations, regulations that denied all unmarried 
fathers rights to their children violated a right to be heard.188  The 
court noted that the state subjected unmarried men to a unique 
dependency proceeding, denying them of “notice, hearing, and 
proof of…unfitness.”189   The state claimed that his claim of fitness 
was “irrelevant.”190  This effort at efficiency and expedience, 
articulated as the best interest of children, oversimplifies a 
presumption of unfitness for unmarried fathers.  Because it 
categorically denies due process to this class of fathers, the Court 
ruled the statute unconstitutional.191 
 States refrain from automatic interpretations of biology as 
definitive of legal parenthood.  Justice Burger’s dissent in Stanley 
viewed marriage or adoption as Peter’s sole legal path to his 
children.192  His status as an unmarried father demonstrates the 
lack of commitment to his deceased partner and his children.193 
Fathers, according to this understanding, do not have a 
connection to children based in nature, but only through law.  
They must avail themselves of the contractual relationship within 
marriage that legally binds men, women, and children.194  Justice 
Burger, like the State of Illinois, justified the restrictions through 
an observation that unwed men, as proved by “centuries of 
human experience,” generally exhibit less responsibility towards 
children.195 
 
C.  Becoming Fathers 
 Relationships between children and fathers find security 
not in nature but in art.  Deliberate actions of legal declarations or 
parental exercises must be present.  This may be examined in two 
ways.  First, marriage dispenses with the biological requirement, 
trumping other sources of paternity.196 Once the state ascertains 
the man’s marriage to the mother, his rights to the child remain, 
absent a termination hearing. No requirement for genetic ties or 
                                               
188 Id. At 649.  
189 Id. at 650. 
190 Id. at 650.  
191 Id. at 657.  
192 Id. at 667 (Burger, J., dissenting).  
193 Id. at 664 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Stanley did not seek the burdens 
when he could have freely assumed them.”)  
194 Id. at 663.  
195 Id. at 666.  
196 Dolgin, supra note 116 at 382.  
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parental activity exists for married men.197  Second, nonmarital 
fathers must demonstrate a higher burden of proof to exercise 
parental prerogatives that states quickly attribute to married 
fathers.  Unmarried fathers must declare legal paternity and 
beyond that, exercise responsibility for the child.198  Substantive 
requirements tests do not exist for married men, because the state 
presumes their commitment.  Biology alone, without 
demonstrating a commitment to parenting the child, fails to 
trigger constitutional protection.199  And marriage alone, minus 
genetics, minus parental support, minus physical presence, 
precludes courts from assessing the biological father’s claim.  
 Such assymetries of parental involvement is over-inclusive 
for both married and unmarried men.  Allowing all married men 
to declare paternity based on status alone belies a fiction that 
conflates genealogy and law.  Presuming husbands to father all 
children born to their wives blindly over-includes children not 
biologically theirs.  At the same time, marital presumptions 
under-include because biological fathers, like Peter Stanley,200 do 
not have the security of protection.   While the state has the 
interest of curtailing the objections of nonpresent, noninvolved 
biological fathers, it overshoots and includes active parents whose 
domestic lives do not mirror the marital norm.   
 Preemptive dismissals engendered by rules of standing and 
presumption definitively assign property rights to children within 
the marital family.201  This procedural snafu achieves two 
objectives.  First, it precludes the assertion of parental rights for 
the marginalized party—the unmarried father.  Prevented from 
establishing paternity, he has no opportunity to develop a 
parental relationship with the child. Third party fathers who have 
already contributed to the family unit have no recourse to assert 
rights within the domestic estate.  Likewise, it protects the 
marital family unit by warding off legal challenges to paternity, 
                                               
197 Id. At 381.  
198 See, Lehr, supra note 3 6.  
199 Caban v. Mohammad at 397. (“Parental rights do not spring full-blown 
from the biological connection between parent and child.  They require 
relationships more enduring.”)  
200 Peter had an 18-year long relationship with his deceased partner, and 
their children together were part of their household. See Stanley , supra note 5 
at 646.  
201 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989); see also Melissa 
Murray, The Networked Family, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 395-96, 444-45 (2008). 
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making it immune to challenges regarding its composition.  In 
preventing outsiders from disrupting the legal relationship 
between the married husband and the extramarital child, it 
furthers the state’s interest of supporting stability within the 
family unit.202 Standing rules ensure that familial inclusion is not 
extended from without but regulated from within. Disallowing 
the paternal supplantation by the third party sustains the 
presumption that children born within a marriage “belong” to the 
husband.  
 States attest that legitimacy statutes promote the best 
interests of children.203 This standard for adjudicating child 
custody permits flexibility rather than unquestioned rigidity, and 
it recognizes family diversity.204   By taking multiple factors into 
account, parental custody shifts from a binary equation to a more 
nuanced inquiry into the needs of the child.205  This great utility of 
best interests allows for a fluid estimation of the child’s life, 
rather than restricting the evaluation to the qualifications of the 
parent.  
 In many ways, Lehr v. Robinson observes a fluidity of 
paternity by basing access to rights on the development of an 
enduring relationship between father and child.206  Lehr shifts 
from biology to affinity to dismiss the interests of the birth father, 
whose decision not to marry opens criticism of his substantive 
relationship with the child.  Instinctually, liberality in family 
construction grants rights to the changing American family, and 
such expansions challenge the notion of “traditional.” But 
                                               
202 Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 797, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
203 Pritchett v. Merritt, 587 S.E.2d 324, 326 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“it is 
implicit that the trial court found that legitimation was in the children's best 
interests”); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 781 (M.D. Ala. 1976). (“Legitimation 
confers benefits on the child and mother by obligating the father to support the 
child and allowing the child to inherit from the father's estate.”) 
204 See, Janet Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the 
New Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 498 (1996); John Dewitt 
Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 5 
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liberality in Lehr further entrenches the “traditional” into the 
concept of family.  Instead of embracing a larger group, it shrinks 
its existing parental constituency.  
 Lehr restricted a biological father from blocking the 
adoption of his daughter by her stepfather.   He had not registered 
with the New York “putative father registry,” which would notify 
a class of potential fathers of the nonmarital child.  The child’s 
mother petitioned for adoption in Dec 1978.  Four months later, 
the court entered an adoption order, and Lehr, the biological 
father, objected because he was not given proper notice. 207  The 
court held that his biological connection to the child was tenuous 
and stretched.  He could have an opportunity to receive notice if 
he had assumed a more active role in the child’s life, or he had 
registered himself as a putative father of the child.208 In what the 
court saw as an eleventh-hour attempt to disrupt the placement 
process, the absent Lehr had no due process to protect, and the 
state had a reason to treat him differently.209 
 The Court’s rejection of Lehr’s due process challenge chides 
him for not asserting his right to be notified about a child. 
Because he failed to complete the simple task of mailing a 
postcard,210 he is now a legal stranger to his child.  Biology aside, 
he has no cognizable leg upon which to stand his paternity.  Other 
men may register as putative fathers and their interests could 
complete with Lehr’s.  These nonbiological figures can hold 
themselves out as fathers to the child, or register their name with 
the state. By the majority, these actions, notwithstanding the 
insignificance of putative father registry, comprise a diligent 
efforts to maintain ties between putative father and child.  Even if 
the child is not biologically theirs, they add labor to the property 
to make it their own. 
 Under Lehr, father’s rights to children as property hinges 
on personal investment.  The Lockean theory of appropriation –of 
mixing one’s labor with property—demands time and resources in 
order to declare oneself as owner.  The candidate who fails to 
appropriate the property for themselves is denied possession by 
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competing others.  As in the ownership of real property, if the 
disseisor claims the property for the duration of the statutory 
period without being ousted, the property becomes hers. 
Traditional treatise definitions of adverse possession assert that 
possession must be exclusive and not shared in order for the 
disseisor to assume ownership. But clear and simple delineations 
of dominion usually do not exist for settling parental disputes.  I 
reiterate that I do not intend to commodify children or suggest 
that they have numerical value.  Rather, this analysis helps to 
conceptualize judicial approaches to paternity that rest upon 
parental labor.   
 If we engage the doctrine of Lehr—that “relationships more 
enduring”211 qualify fathers as parents, we find a hybrid of status 
and effort that distinguishes the unmarried from the married. For 
married men, paternal labor occurs at the moment of marriage to 
the mother.  Men, like women, can be natural fathers—to any 
child—when they marry, which legitimates birth as naturally 
legal.    This preordained status is not available for unmarried 
men, who must separately and newly affirm relationships with 
each child through a declaration of paternity and also an active 
relationship.  Natural links to the child, as states automatically 
grant to the mother, are not attributed to the father when the 
birth occurs outside of marriage.   
 Legally, the marital father has a superior claim to 
fatherhood over the nonmarital father.  With a clear legal 
relationship established between husband and wife, the marital 
husband is legally potent, that is, unassailable in regards to third-
party interlopers. Courts view the initial acceptance of marriage, 
its obligations and responsibilities, as signifying a familial and 
reproductive undertaking that prospectively accepts any children 
born to the spouse. If the unmarried but clearly biological father 
wishes to assert paternity in conflict with a married man, actual 
parentage fails. As a paternal labor, marriage trumps biology, and 
only one father prevails. Paternity based on status, whether 
marital or biological, attempts to dispense with parental 
ambiguity with an efficient solution that instills stability and 
finality, thus streamlining the complex family into a simpler 
structure.  This formula of binary consequences underscores a 
traffic in children that reifies property concepts of exclusive 
ownership and legitimate entitlement. In the next section, offer 
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an alternative way of thinking about children as property that 
moves away from rigid characteristics of consent and ownership 
that purport to serve the best interests of children.  
 
III. THE FIDUCIARY ETHIC OF STEWARDSHIP 
 Equating children with rights of property runs the negative 
risk of commodifying child custody as something to exchange, 
purchase, or flip.   Parents “claim” children212; couples “exclude” 
biological fathers213; families assert “interests” in visitation.214  
These terms of use and possession suggest that children are 
chattels215 in a competition of rights and liberties between adults. 
Understanding this discourse on property facilitates a best 
interests analysis that actually attends to the needs of children in 
addition to the interests of adults.  This does not dispose married 
parents of their liberty interests—it forces a practical analysis of 
the effect of paternity law on children’s lives.  From this vantage 
point we realize the important need for a nuanced and layered 
examination of the complex family that substantively and 
practicably engages the potential role of the unwed father. This 
analysis requires active reworkings of the property foundations of 
paternity. 
 Traditional theories of property emphasize delineation of 
ownership: who owns and who does not.  At the moment that an 
individual obtains an object or thing, they effectively publicize its 
unavailability to the rest of the world.  Labor combined with an 
object allows the person to appropriate the property as their own, 
according to Locke.216   During the tenure of ownership, they have 
use and enjoyment of the property.  Others cannot access the 
property without the consent of the owner.  For Bentham, owning 
property meant “being able to draw such and such advantage 
from the thing possessed,” which describes an unadulterated 
enjoyment that remains untouched by challenges to ownership.217  
This expectancy of not being disturbed provides security, and 
looking ahead to a future adds a temporal longevity to property.  
 But property itself belies a complexity and texture that 
reveals a multiplicity of ownership structures.  The traditional 
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concept of property holds unchallenged, single possession as 
normative, simple, and flat.218  This simplification under-includes 
schemes of borrowing, exchange, and hybridization that 
destabilize the notion of a unified actor with sole authority of 
development and alienation.219  Such a view champions the rights 
of property owners as motivated by wealth-maximization, which 
accedes to a Lockean interest in improvement.220  Distribution of 
benefits from the development of property rests upon an 
expectation of entitlement, which necessitates a clear 
identification of who has access and who may exercise dominion 
over property.  This classic view of property exists in opposition 
to a relational scheme of property that accounts for the 
contributed labor of nonowners as well as their nonmarket 
interests.221  In moving away from an appeal to stability that 
property supposedly engenders, this relational model encompasses 
a sphere of involvement traditionally excluded and marginalized.  
To travel beyond the traditional model of individual ownership 
invites the interests of untitled parties as legitimate and valid 
considerations that cannot be ignored.222 
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A. Complicating Property in Paternity 
If we are to consider the claims of parents in children as 
rooted in a tacit discourse on property rights, married couples 
have title and unmarried fathers do not.  Marital presumptions of 
fatherhood necessarily exclude the interests of biological fathers, 
which poses a dichotomy of legal legitimacy and adultery that 
gives rights only to those who possess title.  These statutory 
schemes align marital interests with the classic view of property 
and biological, unmarried interests with the relational view. But 
as the facts of paternity cases explicitly demonstrate, these 
interests are anything but simple and static.  Instead, complex 
families pose a distinct case for rethinking “ownership” of 
children and the distribution of benefits according to marital 
status.  This divide between “family” and “nonfamily” definitively 
precludes an expansion of kinship to incorporate actual fathers 
who wish to preserve a relationship with their offspring. 
 This seemingly insurmountable divide registers as entirely 
black and white.  Although states have allowed biological fathers 
to rebut223 the presumption of paternity, this remedial scheme 
sustains a notion of ownership in children that defeats the rights 
of an interested party. What is needed is a hybrid model that 
recognizes the fundamental interests of parents in equal efforts at 
facilitating the best interests of children.  As demonstrated in 
Michael H., the unmarried biological father had developed a 
relationship with Victoria that paralleled Gerald’s acceptance of 
her as his legal child. But because Gerald’s status as married to 
the mother allowed him to claim her as his own, Michael’s 
attempt to enforce his due process rights amounts to familial 
trespass.  With states disallowing children to have three parents, 
a binary view of parenthood is imposed that forestalls a 
realization of the complex family. Michael is excluded from access 
to Victoria, while Carole and Gerald, legally empowered by 
marital presumption, keep her in custody.   
 If law redirects the associations generated by biology, it 
follows that there are two modes of association that connect child 
and parent.  In this opposition of nature and nurture, parenthood 
adheres to a rigid script of caregiving and possession that permits 
no more than two claims upon the child.224 This limitation does 
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not benefit the child if it forces termination of one relationship for 
maintenance of another. What is needed here is a diversified 
conception of parental property that simultaneously embraces 
legal and biological characteristics of paternity.  Carpenter et al 
have theorized a model for shared ownership that tranforms the 
classic view of property as singularly owned.  Rather, they offer a 
stewardship vision that acknowledges borrowing and possession, 
which gives language to the fiduciary duty between property 
owner and property steward that both have pertinent interests.225  
Working from the context of cultural property of indigenous 
nations, Carpenter calls for a more inclusive approach to 
indigenous cultural property that animates untitled interests and 
“challenges ownership as the fundamental nexus of property 
interests.”226 
 These lessons of indigenous stewardship critique a model of 
ownership that adheres to stability and simplicity. Such an 
interpretation of stewardship seeks to share in a claim to property 
that engages the opinions and knowledge of indigenous groups 
while simultaneously recognizing the use and appropriation of 
that property by outside groups. For both tangible property (e.g. 
Indian artifacts and remains), intangible property (e.g. Indian 
mascots), and real property (e.g. sacred sites), the strict ownership 
model dispossesses indigenous groups of objects, ideas, and land 
that originated within Indian communities.227  In response to this 
appropriation, stewardship replaces the classic bundle of rights: 
“use, representation, access, and production,”228 with a “web of 
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interests”229 that displaces discrete ownership with shared 
considerations. This vision of cooperation within a context of 
property reveals a commonality of interests that joins nonowners 
and owners to articulate a merged vision of authority.230 
 Thinking of a shared model of property can facilitate the 
best interests of children born into complex families.  Children 
with two fathers, one legal and the other biological, are 
predetermined as better off in the hands of the marital unit.  This 
professed appeal to stability wards off the potential development 
of a nurturing relationship between biological father and child, 
without a dynamic investigation into the child’s needs.  By 
considering that active fathers, albeit extramarital, may 
contribute to the wellbeing of the child, this observes an initial 
interest in the biological connection that does not automatically 
categorize him as a legal stranger.  This transforms paternity from 
an adversarial battle between adults seeking exclusion into a 
vigorous exposition of children’s needs.  Additionally, it turns 
away from a tacit discourse on children as chattels to be owned 
and exchanged between adults. 
 
D.  A Plea for Stewardship 
 A model of stewardship in the family context recognizes a 
triangulation of interests: the married couple, the biological 
father, and the child. The ownership model engages two of these 
prongs to the exclusion of the third.  From this perspective, a 
binary discourse between married parents and child or married 
parents and the biological father, a third party is excluded to the 
detriment of the child.  To borrow from Professors Carpenter, 
Riley, and Katyal, the stewardship model transforms this 
discussion by negotiating a fiduciary ethic into conflicts over 
paternity. Instead of issuing a blanket ruling that the child 
definitively belongs to one parent or the other, stewardship allows 
for a multiplicity of interests that opens the possibility of 
involvement by the biological father. In keeping with Lehr, 
stewardship examines the development of a relationship as a 
claim to fatherhood rather than the circumstance of status.231  In 
the same way that biology fails as an automatic qualification to 
paternity, marital status would not elevate the spouse to qualified 
fatherhood.  Status, then, fails as a proxy of paternity, which 
forces an examination of the actual needs of the child. 
 Critics of this approach will argue that it requires a 
marshalling of unnecessary resources to initiate individual 
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adjudications of paternity.  Marriage exists as a shorthand for 
stability, responsibility, and support, and second guessing this 
central institution enervates the foundational protections of 
matrimony.232  The critical view asserts that marriage provides an 
optimal environment for rearing children, and it serves their best 
interests to live within a structure rooted in the propagation of 
families.  To place marriage on the same evidentiary scale as 
nonmarriage threatens its authority and invades the privacy 
interests of spouses.233 Maintaining the marital presumption 
facilitates the efficient determination of paternity and forestalls 
misguided obstructions of filiation. 
 But stewardship does not force pluralistic paternity.  It 
does not seek to undermine or invade marital relationships, or to 
divest married couples of their children.  It also does not demand 
child-sharing in complex families. Instead, stewardship visualizes 
paternity as dually possible between biological and legal father, as 
a fiduciary relationship between married and unmarried.234  In 
this way, we may view the custodial parent of the child as the 
fiduciary that owes duties to the biological father.235 This 
relationship is based on a wellspring of trust and a host of 
expectations, which surface as fiduciary duties:  loyalty, care, and 
good faith.236   In the majority of cases, the fiduciary is the 
married father who wishes to hold biological father’s child out as 
their own.237  As in any relationship of trust, the fiduciary holds 
legal title to the property, which explains the relationship 
between the marital father and the child.238  This makes the 
married father the common law owner of the property, but this 
ownership is contingent on upholding fiduciary duties. This model 
of paternity turns attention away from who can be the parent to a 
more productive distribution of rights and responsibilities.  
  Guided by a stewardship model, paternity for complex 
families may better satisfy a best interests standard because it 
turns attention away from the legal rights of parents to the actual 
obligations of parenting itself.  Adopting such a model turns away 
from constitutional struggles of marital v. parental interest and a 
tradition of liberties to a reconceptualization of the theoretical 
underpinnings of paternity.  This maintains a property-based 
approach, but it steers away from the chattel understanding to a 
fiduciary vision.  Such duties of loyalty and care require that the 
legal parents act in the interests of others, which creates a lateral 
relationship between the legal parents and biological father. 
Establishing this connection does not give the biological father 
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rights, but it forwards a dynamic of responsibility between father 
and father, or married and unmarried, for the task of raising 
someone else’s child.  This model of fiduciary duties and 
obligations invites complexity by embracing the potential duality 
of fatherhood.  In its support of transparency, stewardship finds 
no shame or imposes no amnesia on the origins of the child. It 
refuses to embrace legal simplicity and statutory falsehoods as the 
traditional method of determining a family.  Uniquely, 
stewardship envisions an equitable and legal accommodation for 
both fathers.  It also offers a more ethically sound interpretation 
of property theory in children that champions parental duties over 
property claims. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 As law sees it, children are either legitimate or illegitimate, 
with no mitigating factors that reflect births occurring outside—
but inside—of marriage. Law attempts to make sense of childbirth 
through marital shorthand that describes their parentage. The 
traditional marital presumption imposes organization in the midst 
of complication, even if that representation is erroneous.  Studies 
estimate that a substantial percentage of children born into 
marital homes have fathers who are not married to the mother.239  
Yet marital presumptions classify these children as “legitimate” 
because they were born within marriage, even to a biological 
father outside the marital dyad.  States claim the presumption 
protects children by ensuring their legitimacy within the legal 
family, and this protection substantiates parental dominion over 
marital children.  
 But this fails to deliver the full story of complex and other 
nontraditional families.240  The rhetoric of paternity cases 
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demonstrates a professed interest in maintaining family stability, 
but this only serves to whitewash nonmarital reproduction for 
purposes of preserving marital reproduction.  Actual knowledge is 
legally revised to reflect a fictional knowledge—law renders 
biological fact impossible.  Paternity, fortified by legal 
presumptions and  prohibitions allows judges to make legal 
conclusions about the contours of the family that are simply 
untrue.  Yet, tradition, as an accumulation of cultural values 
revered by society,241 dictates a path of resistance for stray 
branches of the family tree. Without a history of recognizing the 
seemingly unusual family branches, law redraws the past to 
conform with the mandates of tradition. 
 As reflected in much of legal scholarship on the family, law 
lags behind the changing composition of the “traditional” 
family.242 Although many scholars disagree on what comprises 
“traditional,” courts adhere to conventional notions regarding 
marriage and the presumptions it creates for paternity of children.  
Law imposes a rigid structure of property-based exclusions and 
possessions in children that disgorges unmarried men of an 
opportunity to develop a constitutionally preferred relationship 
with their offspring.  This stance of the statutory ingénue 
mistakenly presupposes the best interests of marriage—in a 
family that deliberately complicates the supposedly 
monofidelitous institution—without a substantive inquiry of the 
merits of sustaining an established relationship between parent 
and child.   Even if “traditional” is a hopeful manifestation of 
reproduction occurring within wedlock, it persists in 
oversimplifying complex family forms by categorically foreclosing 
the “legitimate” interests of children and their biological fathers.   
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